Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking Approach by Fleck, Leonard M.




Michael S. was born in 1984 to unmarried teenage parents who
were without health insurance. He was born with necrotic small
bowel syndrome. Surgery at-birth determined that he would not be
able to process food in the normal way. Hence, he would have to
remain in an intensive care unit, fed via total parenteral nutrition
(TPN). After six months the hospital administrator approached the
attending physician and pointed out that Michael was responsible
for $250,000 in uncompensated care costs. Michael could live
another six to eighteen months, which would mean potential
uncompensated care costs of one million dollars. The administrator
reminded the physician that this was the only hospital in town that
provided charity care to the poor, and that if Michael remained in
the hospital then the emergency room would have to be closed to
all the poor, except those with true life-threatening medical
problems. The state was willing to care for Michael and place him
in a nursing home, but it would not provide TPN, which would
mean Michael would die of infection and/or starvation within two
weeks.
1
This case raises numerous profound moral and political issues.
How should a good doctor respond to this administrator, a doctor
who wants to be both just and caring, a doctor who wants to be both
a fair allocator of limited health resources and a loyal advocate of
this patient's best interests? How should a good administrator
respond to a doctor or parents who want Michael to live as long as
possible when that administrator is responsible for meeting a broad
range of other legitimate health needs that are, admittedly, not now
visibly embodied, as is Michael? If the members of this community
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want to be both just and caring, then how ought they respond to
Michael's needs? We need to keep in mind that there are hundreds
of infants in this community who have serious unmet or inadequate-
ly met health needs; and if the members of this community want to
support Michael generously to show that they care, they must also
confront candidly that they risk treating all these other children
unjustly if they are unwilling to treat them with equal generosity.
The astute reader with a little philosophic training might object at
this point that there is a radical difference between justice and
generosity, and that a generous response by the community ought
not raise questions about justice. That response, however, is too
easy. Generosity is morally praiseworthy only if the more basic
demands of health care justice have been satisfied.
There are two variations on the case of Michael that need to be
considered. First, if we know for certain that Michael is doomed to
die by the age of two, then can we think of ourselves as just and
caring if we refuse to spend that first $250,000? That is, if we
provide Michael with comfort care only and allow him to die shortly
after birth, would we have treated Michael unjustly?
The alternative scenario arises when death is uncertain.
2
Suppose that Michael would die by age two from the TPN treat-
ments, which eventually fatally compromise liver function, but that
a surgeon was willing to do a liver transplant at a cost in excess of
$300,000, which would allow Michael to live to age four. At that
point in time (still in the future) the surgeon is also prepared to
attempt a liver and bowel transplant at a cost that might approach
$500,000. If Michael were denied one or both of these transplants,
would we be justifiably accused of treating him unjustly and
uncaringly?
The reader will note that I have deliberately left unspecified the
"we" in the preceding paragraphs, for that is the central problem to
be addressed in this essay. In a liberal society that claims to be just
and caring, who ultimately should have responsibility for determin-
ing what counts as a fair allocation of always limited health
resources? My reply is that in a liberal democratic society this ought
to be the responsibility of each and every citizen, and that it is
through processes of informed public discourse that such decisions
ought to be made.
2 This scenario was called to my attention by a nurse at a conference sponsored
by the National Kidney Foundation of Michigan in June of 1991. I was speaking at
that conference and had used the story of Michael S.
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In affirming this view I am rejecting the view that any purely
private decisionmaking mechanism is morally defensible, whether
that is an impersonal mechanism such as markets, or more personal
approaches wherein doctors, families, administrators, insurers, or
employers negotiate these decisions. I am not rejecting absolutely
such private decisionmaking mechanisms; rather, my claim is that
their appropriate use will be circumscribed by the decisions that
emerge from this broader process of informed public discourse.
Similarly, I am rejecting the view that governmental mechanisms,
whether legislative, judicial, or administrative, should be the primary
mechanisms through which these decisions are made, though I
readily concede that they have a necessary role to play in imple-
menting and legitimating the decisions that are a product of public
conversation. Finally, although expertise related to health econom-
ics, organizational behavior, and other disciplines is necessary to
inform the public's dialogue, I reject the view that experts of any
kind should have decisional authority regarding allocational and
rationing decisions, except in a limited range of circumstances
where such authority has been granted as a result of broad,
democratic public conversations.
This essay begins with a long prefatory argument; its purpose is
to lay out the intellectual presuppositions that provide the frame-
work for the central problem of this essay. Specifically, I need to
show that the problem of health care rationing is fundamentally a
moral and political problem, and not fundamentally an economic,
managerial, organizational, or technological problem (i.e., the kind
of problem that might best be solved by tinkering with economic
incentives, restructuring delivery systems and professional behavior,
or by technological ingenuity that finds innovative ways of unclog-
ging occluded arteries more efficiently). For if any of these ways of
characterizing the problem were ultimately correct, then some
assortment of economists, bureaucrats, and technocrats would have
ultimate responsibility for finding an appropriate resolution that
would be expressed through market reforms, tighter regulations,
and detailed practice guidelines. That is, the informed democratic
consensus approach which I advocate would then be entirely
wrongheaded. But if health care rationing is fundamentally a moral
and political problem, then a democratic consensus approach is at
least prima facie reasonable.
Some readers might find intellectually disconcerting the
juxtaposition of morality and politics, especially if this carries the
suggestion that some of our fundamental moral beliefs regarding
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justice might be a product of some sort of democratic conversation.
In my judgment, however, this is precisely the view that is required
if we are going to come to an uncoerced agreement on matters of
social policy in a liberal democratic culture. The political philosoph-
ical tradition which I draw from is that of John Dewey, the later
Rawls, and Richard Rorty.3 This is essentially a pragmatic philo-
sophic tradition that eschews metaphysically or theologically based
s For example, John Dewey argues:
The need for security compels men to fasten upon the regular in order to
minimize and to control the precarious and fluctuating.... Philosophies
have too often tried to forego the actual work that is involved in penetrating
the true nature of experience, by setting up a purely theoretical security and
certainty. [This has] influence[d] ... the traditional philosophic preference
for unity, permanence [and] universals, over plurality, change and
particulars ....
JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE at xiii (2d ed. 1929). Dewey also believes:
[T]he first problem for philosophy would seem to be to clear itself of
further responsibility for the doctrine that the supreme issue is whether
values have antecedent Being.... [T]he genuine issue is not whether certain
values, associated with traditions and institutions, have Being already....
but what concrete judgments we are to form about ends and means in the
regulation of practical behavior.
JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 47 (1930); see also JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN
NATURE AND CONDUCT 282-83 (1922) [hereinafter DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE].
According to Rawls:
IJ]ustifying a conception of justice is not primarily an epistemological
problem. The search for reasonable grounds for reaching agreement rooted
in our conception of ourselves and in our relation to society replaces the
search for moral truth interpreted as fixed by a prior and independent
order of objects and relations, whether natural or divine, an order apart and
distinct from how we conceive ourselves .... Whatjustifies a conception of
justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but
its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our
aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions
embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us.
John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 519 (1980)
[hereinafter Rawls, Kantian Constructivism]. Rawls further states:
[A]s a practical political matter no general moral conception can provide a
publicly recognized basis for a conception ofjustice in a modern democratic
state.... [A] workable conception of political justice.., must allow for a
diversity of doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommen-
surable, conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of existing
democratic societies.
John Rawls,Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223,
225 (1985); see also Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in THE
VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 257, 271 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert
C. Vaughan eds., 1988) (arguing that "reflective equilibrium is all we need try for-
that there is no natural order ofjustification of beliefs, no predestined outline for
argument to trace").
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rational certitude for our moral and political beliefs. Instead, this
tradition asserts that it is enough for a liberal democratic society to
ground its moral and political beliefs in reasoned agreement since
it can never escape the contingencies of its culture. From a
Deweyan perspective, we can never get beyond experimental reason
to some eternal moral truth.4 For Rawls, our objective is not to find
a conception ofjustice suitable for all societies, but rather, "to settle
a fundamental disagreement over the just form of basic institutions
within a democratic society under modern conditions." 5 For our
purposes we are seeking a conception of health care justice that
speaks to our disagreements regarding a fair distribution of health
care in our society. I now turn to my expanded argument.
I. HEALTH CARE: A MORAL GOOD, A PUBLIC GOOD
How health care is distributed is a moral matter; specifically, it
is a matter of social justice. This is a rejection of the claim that
health care is simply another commodity properly distributed in
accord with ability to pay. There seems to be a widely agreed upon
moral judgment in our society, for example, that it would be
fundamentally wrong to auction off transplantable hearts or livers
to the highest bidder. Similarly, the case of Michael should not
occasion even minimal moral reflection if health care is properly
distributed in accordance with ability to pay. But the fact is that we
are morally troubled when we are confronted with cases like that of
Michael. This is not just a psychological fact. One moral reason
would seem to be that we have very effective health technologies
today that often make the difference between life and death. This
is one of those contingent facts that was not true prior to 1900. It
is terribly unfortunate when nature causes the death of a child.
That does not trouble our conscience. But when we conspire with
nature to allow the death of a child, then our social conscience
ought to be troubled. Another moral reason, as Daniels has argued,
is that access to needed health care protects fair equality of
opportunity in our society in much the same way that education
does:
[E]ducational needs, like health-care needs, differ from other basic
needs, such as the need for food and clothing, which are more
equally distributed between persons. The combination of their
4 See DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 3, at 282.
5 Rawls, Kantian Constructivism, supra note 3, at 518.
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unequal distribution and their great strategic importance for opportuni-
ty puts these needs in a separate category from those basic needs
we can expect people to purchase from their fair income shares,
like food and shelter.
6
My claim that the distribution of health care is a matter of social
justice is also a rejection of the view that it is a matter of social
beneficence or charity. In other words, allowing Medicaid coverage
of the poor to vary from state to state in accord with the charitable
impulses of local taxpayers and legislators is unjust. I concede that
this latter claim is a legitimate object of social controversy, though
I would argue that the legitimate controversy pertains to where we
draw the line between health services that our society is justly
obligated to guarantee to all and other health services that are
justifiably distributed through markets or charitable social inclina-
tions. For many of us it is difficult to discern the moral justification
for allowing Michael's fate to be determined by whether he is a
resident of Kansas or Missouri.7
Next, my claim is that access to health care is properly thought
of as a public interest, and hence, as a matter of social justice. The
considerations that support this contention are the following. First,
we have a first-rate health care system because of huge public
investments (i.e. subsidies) in medical education, medical research,
medical technology, and the building of modern health care
facilities. Second, we use the power of the state to grant monopoly
power to physicians to practice medicine. Third, we justifiably
speak of health care as a public interest because individuals as such
are not able to protect this interest adequately on their own in our
society. Would the elderly, for example, the vast majority of whom
have one or more chronic illnesses (and are not employed), have
6 NORMAN DANIELs,JusT HEALTH CARE 46-47 (1985). For further arguments in
support of the claim that the way health care is distributed is a moral problem, see
1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 1-47
(1983) (arguing, id. at 16-17, that "[eithical concern about the distribution of health
care derives from the special importance of health care in promoting personal well-
being," in broadening "a person's range of opportunities," in relieving "worry... by
supplying reliable information about [a patient's] health," and in expressing and
nurturing "bonds of empathy and compassion").
7 For additional support of my claim that the distribution of health care is a
matter of social justice and not simply social beneficence, see my other writings on
the subject: Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care (I): Is Beneficence Enough?, 10
THEORETICAL MED. 167 (1989), and Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care (I): Is
Equality Too Much?, 10 THEORETICAL MED. 301 (1989).
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access to adequate health care if they had to rely entirely upon
private insurance for that access rather than Medicare? I remind
the reader that those over age sixty-five made up about thirteen
percent of the population in 1990 but were responsible for about
twenty-nine percent of health expenditures that year, or about 200
billion dollars.
8
From all these observations I want to draw a relatively unstartl-
ing conclusion; namely, there are legitimate public interests in
health care that need protection through public policy and these are
moral interests as well. Another way to put this conclusion is that
society should not be indifferent about the distribution of health
care in the way society is indifferent about the distribution of most
consumer goods.
II. HEALTH CARE RATIONING: AN INESCAPABLE
SOCIAL POLICY PROBLEM
There are limits to what we as a society ought to spend on
health care because there are other competing social goods that
make legitimate claims on that finite set of dollars. Hence, the need
for health care rationing is inescapable. 9 Here we need to devote
some attention to definitional matters.
If our concept of rationing includes both price and non-price
rationing, then our claim about the inescapability of health care
I See Seniors and Health Costs, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 1992, at 1A.
9 What I shall refer to as the generic argument for health care rationing is best
made by Fuchs and Thurow. See, e.g., VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIvE?: HEALTH,
ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 29 (1974) (arguing that the problems of access to
health care must be analyzed from "an economic point of view": "we must recognize
the scarcity of resources and the need to allocate them as efficiently as possible. We
must recognize that we can't have everything."); Victor R. Fuchs, The "Rationing" of
Medical Care, 311 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1572, 1573 (1984) (asserting that in the future,
health plan managers, hospital administrators, insurance company executives, and
government officials will use "considerably more systematic analyses regarding the
location of facilities, investment in equipment, training of specialists, and designing
of screening programs and treatment protocols ... to help them make difficult
decisions about the allocation of scarce resources"); Lester C. Thurow, Learning to Say
"No, "311 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1569, 1569 (1984) (arguing that "new medical techniques
require a shift in standard medical practice [and that i]nstead of stopping treatments
when all benefits cease to exist, physicians must stop treatments when marginal
benefits are equal to marginal costs"); Lester C. Thurow, Medicine Versus Economics,
313 NEw ENG.J. MED. 611, 612 (1985) (contending that in order to keep health care
costs affordable the current "retrospective fee-for-service, insured-reimbursement
system" must be replaced with payers (government or corporation) only providing
"so-much-per-patient payments").
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rationing becomes uninteresting. Rationing of this kind would not
inspire moral or political outrage. Michael Reagan makes some
helpful analytic points. He defines rationing as "a mode of non-
price distribution of particular services among particular individu-
als." 10 Here he is endorsing Robert Blank's point that rationing
involves "making a choice among the claims of individuals who are
competing for resources limited by public policy."" Reagan goes
on to note that rationing is "inherently comparative," and it involves
a situation in which community policymakers seek to achieve an
equitable distribution of what is a scarce resource.1 2 Finally, Reagan
wants to distinguish rationing decisions from allocation decisions,
the latter being administrative decisions about the relative size of
budgets.' 3 There is one other element of our public conception
of rationing that needs to be made explicit, what Lawrence Brown
refers to as "cost-effective retrenchment." 14 Under this rubric,
rationing means "the deliberate, systematic withholding of beneficial
goods or services from some elements of the population on the
grounds that society cannot afford to extend them."
15
When we combine what Blank, Brown, and Reagan have to say
about rationing, we can more readily appreciate why physicians and
politicians want to avoid health care rationing. More specifically,
rationing means that identified individuals, like Michael, who can
command our sympathies, are denied potentially beneficial medical
care, which means either that they are condemned to premature
death or to substantial unnecessary suffering. By way of contrast,
we are unmoved when American Medical News reports that the
uninsured poor have a ten to fifteen percent excess death rate from
cancer because they fail to obtain early primary care that they
cannot afford. 16 These are faceless individuals whose deaths will not
be publicly recognized at all, much less seen as being unjust.
In addition, rationing usually means that physicians-individuals
who are supposed to be loyal advocates of their patients' best
10 Michael D. Reagan, Health Care Rationing and Cost Containment Are Not
Synonymous, 9 POL'Y STUD. REv. 219, 223 (1990).
11 ROBERT H. BLANK, RATIONING MEDICINE 78 (1988).
12 See Reagan, supra note 10, at 223.
13 See id.
14 Lawrence D. Brown, The National Politics of Oregon's Rationing Plan, HEALTH
AFF., Summer 1991, at 28, 30-31.
15 Id. at 30.
16 See Deborah S. Pinkney, ACS Report: Poor Caught in Cancer Trap, AM. MED.
NEWS, July 28, 1989, at 1, 38-39.
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interests-will either make or acquiesce in decisions to deny
individuals potentially beneficial medical care. Similarly, rationing
means that government, which is supposed to protect equally the
rights of all its citizens, will deny an identified citizen potentially
life-sustaining medical care by saying, in effect, that Michael's needs
count for less than the needs of some other citizen. Fourth,
rationing means that government will deny one of its citizens life-
sustaining medical care on the basis of an arbitrary budgetary limit.
Finally, rationing means that a liberal, democratic government will
appeal to some conception of equity to justify its rationing deci-
sions, and this conception of equity may not be endorsed by those
citizens whose lives are directly affected by these rationing deci-
sions. Liberal governments are supposed to be assiduously neutral
among competing moral conceptions of the right and good.
Further, how legitimate is a conception of equity, used to justify
rationing decisions, which is a product of interest group power and
political skill? After these considerations, the reader should not be
surprised that health care rationing would be an object of intense
obloquy, that every effort would be made to escape "the need" for
health care rationing, and that virtually any other approach to
health care cost containment would be preferable to rationing. This
is a conclusion I reject for reasons that I will address later.
17
What are the alternatives to health care rationing? Marcia
Angell wrote one of the early papers delineating the possibilities,'
8
and her analysis is echoed in numerous others. 19 Her basic
conclusions are that there is enormous waste and inefficiency in the
health care system, that all this waste and inefficiency must be
rooted out before we contemplate denying beneficial health care to
patients, and that this can be accomplished through health planning,
technology assessment, and practice guidelines, among other
things.
20
17 See infra text accompanying notes 39-51.
18 See Marcia Angell, Cost Containment and the Physician, 254JAMA 1203 (1985).
19 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 14, at 49 (concluding that "[c]ritics can fairly charge
that Oregon surrendered to rationing without waging a serious war on the supply-side
sources of rising health costs"); Arnold S. Relman, Is Rationing Inevitable?, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1809, 1810 (1990) (asserting that "there are vast savings to be made
through the elimination of unnecessary services and facilities"); Arnold S. Relman,
The Trouble With Rationing, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 911, 912 (1990) (advocating
changing "certain features of the [health care] system" to eliminate "duplication and
waste of resources and.., excessive overhead costs").
20 See Angell, supra note 18, at 1206-07.
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Both a "technical response" and "moral response" can be given
to this line of argument. The "technical response" is given very
adequately by Schwartz and Aaron.2 1 They assert that any savings
achieved by efficiency measures represent a one-time saving that
reduces the base for health care spending but does nothing to alter
the underlying trends that inflate health care costs.2 2 For the past
twenty years health expenditures have been increasing annually at
more than twice the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). They are projected to increase at a rate of ten
percent for each year between 1992 and 1995,23 which means that
if we could achieve an instantaneous thirty percent base reduction
this year (the amount Angell believes the base could be reduced by,
though not instantaneously), it would take only 3.5 years to restore
our projected 1992 base of 818 billion dollars.
If Aaron and Schwartz are right, then what is the attraction of
achieving such fleeting efficiencies? Essentially, all the approaches
to health care cost containment touted by assorted economists,
policy analysts, and physicians have the virtue of objectivity attached
to them. That is, it is markets or scientific research that are yielding
these cost-controlling efficiencies in an impersonal, value-neutral,
apolitical way. No doubt there are individuals who are adversely
21 See, e.g., Henry Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice
Before Us, 247 SCIENCE 418, 419 (1990) ("Various methods [which] have been
proposed for cutting costs and improving efficiency... all promise to arrest or slow
the growth of medical costs only temporarily."); William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable
Failure of Current Cost-Containment Strategies, 257 JAMA 220, 220-21 (1987) ("[E]ven
if all useless care were gradually eliminated, we could anticipate only a temporary
respite from rising costs unless the forces sustaining the real rate of change-chiefly
technologic innovation and rising input prices-were simultaneously brought under
control."). Daniel Callahan offers an expanded version of this argument with which
I fully concur:
The most basic contradiction is that at the same time that we desire to
control costs, we want also to improve the quality and extent of, and access
to, health care .... At the same time that we try to contain costs, and avoid
rationing, we continue to affirm those values that drive up costs.
DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE?: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 78-79
(1990).
22 See Aaron & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 419.
23 See Sally T. Sonnefeld et al., Projections of National Health Expenditures Through
the Year 2000, 13 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv. 1, 4 (1991). For purposes of my
example I restricted myself to 1992-95. These researchers project a slow decline to
7-8% annual increases in health expenditures for the latter half of the decade, which
will still yield national health expenditures of 1.6 trillion dollars by the year 2000,
equal to 16.4% of GNP then. See id. For longer range projections, see Daniel R.
Waldo et al., Health Spending Through 2030: Three Scenarios, HEALTH AFF., Winter
1991, at 231.
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affected by these cost-containing devices, but these will not be
politically visible individuals because their death or untreated
disease will be seen as simply unfortunate, a mere extension of the
natural lottery. No agent of society will have identified them as
being less worthy of receiving expensive, life-prolonging medical
care. Hence, there will be no need for bitter and divisive public
debate about health care rationing, especially with regard to
identified individuals like Michael. More specifically, these
approaches to containing health care costs avoid having to confront
health care choices as moral problems.
At this point three questions need to be posed. First, has the
need for health care rationing really been avoided through these
technical approaches to cost containment? My response is that the
rationing has simply been masked so that it is hidden and implicit.
This is societal self-deception on a massive scale. Second, has health
care cost-containment been successfully avoided as a moral
problem? Again, my response is that the moral problem of health
care justice has been avoided, and this is something open to
legitimate moral criticism. Third, did our earlier discussion of the
conception of rationing by Reagan, Blank, and Brown really capture
what was morally and politically most objectionable about health
care rationing? No! What is most objectionable about health care
rationing is that it is not self-imposed. Rather, the healthy, wealthy,
and relatively politically powerful impose rationing schemes upon
the sick, the poor, and the relatively politically powerless. The
moral and political virtue of the informed democratic consensus
approach to health care rationing for which I shall argue is that the
rationing principles and protocols that emerge from that conversa-
tion will be freely self-imposed, explicit, consistently applied to all
in that community, and a product of a shared conception of health
care justice that will emerge from a conversation among undomina-
ted equals.
IIl. IF HEALTH ALLOCATION, THEN HEALTH RATIONING:
AN INESCAPABLE IMPLICATION
It is my contention that allocation decisions ultimately imply
rationing decisions, and that the need for health care rationing
really is inescapable. This is not a conclusion that Michael Reagan
will accept, for he wants to make a sharp distinction between
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allocation and rationing.24  At the level of allocation decisions
there are no identified individuals; impersonal rules and impersonal
equations are what generate results. Reagan chides Fuchs and
Thurow and other health economists for confusing these two
levels. 25  I am inclined, however, to agree with Calabresi and
Bobbitt that this distinction serves as a convenient device for
societal self-deception that allows us to believe we are not making
any invidious moral choices.
26
For Calabresi and Bobbitt the challenge to society is "to make
allocations in ways that preserve the moral foundations of social
collaboration." 2 7  The title of their book, Tragic Choices, comes
from their claim that any allocational choices will ultimately violate
some deeply held societal value. "Action in the context of necessary
scarcity brings ultimate values, the values by which a society defines
itself, into conflict."28 They distinguish what they call first-order
and second-order allocation decisions, decisions regarding how
much of a scarce good will be produced and decisions regarding
who will get that good. 29  They also point out that societies
typically make decisions at these two levels separately so that a
different mixture of values exists at each level.30 So long as these
levels can be kept separate, as far as societal consciousness is
concerned, the illusion can be preserved that none of society's basic
values have been disregarded. 31 For example, we might stint on
mine safety because the price of coal has been declining and we
want to preserve those jobs and the business investment. That
means the lives of some men will be placed at risk, but we view that
risk as acceptable in light of the benefits that it produces. Then, if
there is a mine accident, we will spare virtually no expense in a
rescue effort which we may well know is likely to be futile. Still, in
that way we will have affirmed that human life is priceless at that
24 See Reagan, supra note 10, at 224.
25 See id. at 224 (rejecting Fuch's notion that rationing is "reducing the volume of
services" and Thurow's belief that rationing is a process of making choices based on
a "cost benefit analysis").26 See GuiDo CALABRFsi & PHILIP BoBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 20 (1978).
27 Id. at 18.
28 id.
29 See id. at 19.
30 See id. at 20.
31 See id. ("[W]hen the first-order determination of a tragic choice appears to be
no more than a dependent function of the second order, it will usually be the case
that the connection is illusory, serving to obscure the fact of tragic scarcity and-while
the illusion lasts-evading the tragic choice.").
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level, though we effectively denied the same value at the safety
allocation level. Enterprising reporters might embarrass us by
putting both decisions before the public at once. Barring that,
however, the result will seem "necessary, unavoidable, rather than
chosen" which will "convert what is tragically chosen into what is
merely a fatal misfortune."32 Note that Calabresi and Bobbitt are
honest enough to admit that societal choices have been made here
and these choices reflect some pattern of values.
What is it that Reagan hopes to achieve by making this sharp
distinction between allocation and rationing decisions? So long as
we focus on allocation decisions, getting rid of waste and inefficien-
cy in our health care system, we will not "have any compelling
public interest reason for instituting a system of explicit ration-
ing."33 I contend, however, that what we would have instead is
implicit, hidden or invisible rationing wherein individuals would still
be denied needed, potentially beneficial medical care, though they
would not feel they had been denied that care. Implicit rationing
has nothing to recommend it, morally or politically. Let us consider
some examples.
There are about ten million x-ray examinations done each year
in the United States using a contrast medium that costs ten dollars
per procedure. About 300 people will have a fatal reaction to that
contrast medium, however. There is another contrast medium that
can be used that costs $100 per procedure and that will reduce fatal
reactions to thirty per year. It has been estimated, however, that
the switch to this medium would add 1 billion dollars to the cost of
health care in the United States.3 4 Should we think of such an
expenditure as being wasteful or outrageously expensive when this
32 Id. at 21.
33 Reagan, supra note 10, at 228. In this Issue, Blustein and Marmor cogently
argue against what they describe as the "bureaucratically sanctioned linguistic drift"
and "conceptual hodgepodge" that is represented by the phrase "wasteful [medical]
care." Jan Blustein & Theodore R. Marmor, Cutting Waste by MakingRules: Promises,
Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1543, 1545 (1992). They too argue
that this phrase is used to mask what are often ethically troubling allocation decisions.
Getting rid of medical waste and inefficiency looks like a morally and politically
painless panacea for the problem of escalating health care costs. It is noti
34 See Aaron & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 422; see also Earl P. Steinberg et al.,
Safety and Cost Effectiveness of High-Osmolality As Compared with Low-Osmolality Contrast
Material in Patients Undergoing CardiacAngiography, 326 NEW ENG.J. MED. 425 (1992).
These authors note a twenty-fold cost differential between the two types of contrast
material. They also note that patients over age sixty with unstable angina have a 3.5
times greater chance of a severe reaction to the less expensive contrast material. See
id. at 425.
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means a cost of three million dollars per life saved? This question
does not seem to have any obvious, rationally compelling answer.
The choice really needs further specification, and some other social
values need to be brought in before the decision-making process
can begin. What if seventy percent of private insurance firms
included the more expensive contrast medium in their benefit
packages but Medicare and Medicaid did not? Should this be
morally troubling? Should those in the middle class who are not
eligible for Medicare or Medicaid acquiesce to this as just another
budgetary choice, though the obvious consequence will be a number
of premature deaths among the old and the poor? Is there anything
that would excuse us from taking moral responsibility for a decision
like this, other than our pretending that it is not really a decision?
The Medicare scenario is really the more interesting one for our
purposes since, under Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs), the federal
government would say nothing at all about which contrast medium
ought to be used. How then would Reagan conceptualize this
situation-allocation or rationing? The financial incentives are clear.
Hospitals would "lose money" if they provided the more expensive
medium to all their patients. What if, as seems likely in a real world
scenario, more educated and assertive Medicare patients asked
specifically for the more expensive medium, and hospitals generally
acquiesced to their choices while providing only the less expensive
medium to nonassertive Medicare patients? Would Reagan describe
this as rationing or prudent allocation? In my judgment it would be
patent dissembling to call this anything but rationing. And if this
is true, then rationing is a rampant feature of Medicare DRGs,
though hidden from effective public scrutiny, as I have argued
elsewhere.
35
The more general conclusion I wish to draw is that even though
allocation decisions in Reagan's sense will only affect "statistical
individuals," these individuals will be real in the future. Failure to
assess publicly alternative allocation options from a moral point of
view will likely result in serious injustices. Helga Wanglie and
Nancy Gruzan are two cases in point. Helga Wanglie was an eighty-
five-year old woman who suffered a very serious heart attack in May
35 See, e.g., Leonard M. Fleck, DRGs: Justice and the Invisible Rationing of Health
Care Resources, 12 J. MED. & PHIL. 165, 185 (1987) (asserting that in the case of
DRG's, the decisions of physicians and hospital administrators regarding the
allocation of life-prolonging resources to either individuals or groups of individuals
is "localized," "privatized," and therefore "invisible" in that they "would not be
required to publicize any 'official' allocation criteria").
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of 1990 that resulted in her being reduced to a persistent vegetative
state on a respirator in a hospital Intensive Care Unit (ICU). After
five months, her physicians wanted to withdraw her from the
respirator and allow her to die on the grounds that the care they
were providing was medically futile. Her husband and two children
protested that their mother wanted to be kept alive for as long as
possible, even if in a state of bare biological existence. The result
was that she survived for sixteen months at a cost in excess of
$700,000.36 Did Helga Wanglie have a just claim to resources of
this magnitude in these circumstances? It is impossible to answer
this question by any appeal to simply economic or efficiency
criteria. This is a moral issue that must be addressed as such. We
must ask at the allocative level whether any patient in a persistent
vegetative state has a moral claim to anything more than comfort
care, where "any patient" includes our future possible selves. For
example, it is prima facie unjust that the state of Missouri would
spend close to one million dollars in Medicaid funds to keep Nancy
Cruzan alive for nearly eight years in a persistent vegetative state
3 7
while providing access to Medicaid for only forty percent of those
below the poverty level in Missouri. 8 That one million dollars
would have purc~hased substantial medical benefits for some number
of uninsured poor Missouri citizens. It would be the height of
moral obtuseness if some state bureaucrat brushed off this moral
criticism with the claim that an allocation decision had been made,
not a rationing decision, and that was the end of the discussion.
The very general conclusion I wish to draw at this point is that
objective approaches to health care cost containment (practice
guidelines, technology assessment, cost-effectiveness research, cost-
benefit analysis, health planning strategies that would control the
number of IGU beds or transplant centers or artificial hearts
produced) are all legitimate approaches to cost containment that
ultimately rest upon moral premises. My further claim is that these
moral premises need to be made explicit so that they can be
publicly assessed through a democratic consensus mechanism.
36 See Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325
NEw ENG.J. MED. 512, 513 (1991).37 SeeJoan H. Lewis, How Much Care Can We Afford?: Basic Treatment for Many vs.
Costly Measures for a Few, WASH. POST, July 9, 1991, at Z6.
88 See Rick Curtis, The Role of State Governments in Assuring Access to Care, 23
INQUIRY 277, 279 tbl. 1 (1986).
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IV. A MORALLY INEXCUSABLE TRAGIC CHOICE:
INVISIBLE RATIONING
There is no adequate moral or political justification for implicit
or invisible rationing. Rawls points out that a core element of our
shared conception of justice is the "publicity condition," which says
in effect that when we have fair policies and practices, nothing
needs to be hidden. 39 Aaron and Schwartz provide us with a
convenient example of invisible rationing. In Britain, dialysis is
provided to only about thirty-five percent of the patients who could
medically benefit from the procedure. In general, neither individu-
als over age sixty-five, nor individuals over age fifty-five who have a
complicating medical condition, such as diabetes or heart disease in
addition to renal failure, are offered dialysis.40 But there are no
formally promulgated rules. Physicians recognize that there are
only so many dialysis slots because of limited government budgets.
Hence, informal understandings have arisen among physicians
regarding patients who are "good" candidates for dialysis. Patients
who are denied access to dialysis are not told they are being denied
dialysis for some reason. Instead, they are simply told that nothing
more can be done medically, which leaves them with the belief that
they have a medically untreatable condition rather than one that has
been judged socially and economically unworthy of treatment. This
is not a morally tolerable state of affairs. As Ronald Bayer observes,
invisible rationing decisions are "beyond the pale of public scrutiny
or accountability," which means that criteria may be used that are
"capricious, unreasonable, or dangerous."41
Calabresi and Bobbitt are among those who defend the moral
legitimacy of invisible rationing mechanisms. Their basic claim is
that society is becoming more frequently ensnared in "tragic choice"
situations. These are situations involving a fundamental conflict of
societal values such that choosing and affirming one value necessi-
tates violating the other.42 For them any choice made in these
circumstances is profoundly morally flawed. Hence, in the face of
39 See Rawls, Kantian Constructivisrn, supra note 3, at 535-54.
-0 See HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION:
RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE 28, 34-35 (1984). For a thorough discussion of the
history, politics, economics and ethics of the end-stage renal dialysis program in Great
Britain, see THOMAS HALPER, THE MISFORTUNES OF OTHERS: END-STAGE RENAL
DISEASE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1989).
41 Ronald Bayer et al., The Care of the Terminally Ill: Morality and Economics, 309
NEw ENG.J. MED. 1490, 1490-91 (1983).
42 See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 26, at 18-19.
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these tragic choices, the fundamental moral problem is to "preserve
the moral foundations of social collaboration." 43 And if any
choice made threatens the moral foundations of society, then that
provides a moral warrant for making it invisibly, in a way that
escapes public scrutiny.44 In short, if Calabresi and Bobbitt are
43 Id. at 18.
44 In myjudgment Calabresi and Bobbitt flip-flop between descriptive (sociologi-
cal) ethics and normative (philosophic) ethics. There are numerous passages in the
early part of their book that suggest that their primary intent is to describe these tragic
choices as they emerge in various political/economic circumstances, and then to
describe the ways in which societies use various social mechanisms to hide or evade
or cope with these tragic choices. In other words, they make no judgment at all
about the rightness or wrongness of these coping strategies. An illustrative passage
supporting this point reads: "Examples too often are taken to imply prescription or
solution, and we have few prescriptions and no solutions." Id. at 17.
But they also make clearly prescriptive judgments, such as: "[H]onesty must be
protected from those allocation methods which taint it.... [H]onesty] is more than
an instrument, it is measurement itself, for it is honesty which allows us to see clearly,
and occasionally appreciate, the ways, some subtle and some not honest, by which
societies must cope." Id. at 26. This certainly sounds like a strong prescriptive
endorsement of honesty as a basic societal value. Indeed, we can see their writing of
this book as an affirmation of this value. But they also write: "They [honesty and
openness] are no more absolute than the other values [sanctity of life and equality of
all men]." Id. at 50. This too is a prescriptive statement, though it suggests honesty
and openness may be traded off in order to protect other basic values. Again, they
write:
Honesty is also ambivalent. It has the remarkable quality that it is capable
of beingabandoned with regard to some questions without being destroyed
everywhere. Thus it can often be of service to the tragic choice by being
neglected-indeed the usefulness of some allocation methods depends
almost entirely on the charade that they serve the purposes they say they do.
Id. at 24.
In their concluding chapter Calabresi and Bobbitt write: "The answer is, we have
come to think, that a society may limit the destructive impact of tragic choices by
choosing to mix [allocation/rationing] approaches over time. Endangered values are
reaffirmed. The ultimate cost to other values is not immediately borne." Id. at 196.
And:
Since the values endangered by any given [allocation/ rationing] approach
vary, a society which wishes to reject none of them can, by moving, with
desperate grace, from one approach to another, reaffirm the most
threatened basic value and thereby seek to assure that its function as an
underpinning of the society is not permanently lost.
Id. at 198. This certainly appears to be an endorsement of implicit rationing
approaches and the compromise of social honesty that is integral to such approaches.
This is clearly how Steven Rhoads approvingly reads Tragic Choices. He writes that
he would "tolerate a little dissembling in this area [choosing which lives to save at
what price]" rather than publicly admit that human life is not priceless. Steven E.
Rhoads, How Much Should We Spend to Save a Life?, in VALUING LIFE: PUBLIC POLICY
DILEMMAS 285, 305 (Steven E. Rhoads ed., 1980). Again Calabresi and Bobbitt can
follow their own recommendation and move "with desperate grace" to affirm that
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right, then the argument I would make for a democratic consensus
approach to health care rationing is fundamentally wrong.
However, I will argue that their account is open to criticism.
Invisible rationing mechanisms certainly seem to violate our
societal sense of honesty. Calabresi and Bobbitt clearly want to
maintain that honesty and openness, which are essential structural
values in our society.4 5 Still, if we are totally honest, then we will
have visible tragic choices, "an exposed inegalitarianism" and
"exposed decisions against life."46 Their main point is that tragic
choices are not amenable to rational moral resolution.47 All such
efforts will be tragically flawed. The best that any society can hope
is to "cope" with these tragic choices, and invisible rationing
mechanisms are among these coping devices. These coping devices
have moral utility because they protect the bonds of society from
the otherwise corrosive effects of exposed tragic choices, but they
are never fully morally justified because they violate the basic norms
of honesty.
Two critical comments are in order. First, why did Calabresi
and Bobbitt write their book? Their reply is that their effort would
"allow us, as citizens, to accept responsibility for tragic choices
decided in our names," and enable us to better see ourselves "acting
honesty and openness are basic societal values that they unequivocally endorse. But
then we have Professor Brian Barry's observation in his review of Tragic Choices:
[T]he book gives the impression that this is what it is about: not how
societies cope with tragic choices but how they attempt to deny their
existence. It is not very easy to show this by selective quotation, but I think
that anyone who has read the book is likely to have come away from it with
the feeling that the book is about fudging rather than facing policy choices
in life and death cases.
Brian Barry, Tragic Choices, 94 ETHics 303, 308 (1984) (book review). I completely
concur with this conclusion.
45 See CALABREsI & BOBB1TT, supra note 26, at 50.
46 Id. at 37.
47 To be sure, Calabresi and Bobbitt say that societies attempt to use rational
means, such as markets and political allocation mechanisms, to address these deep
and tragic value conflicts. The result of these efforts is that "the tragic choice is
transformed into an allocation which does not appear to implicate moral contradictions.
Morally debasing outcomes are averted. But unless the values held in tension have
changed, the illusion that denies their conflict gives way and the transformation will
have only been a postponement." Id. at 18 (emphasis added). They go on to quote
several writers on tragedy who speak of "insuperable moral difficulty," "the
inevitability of paradox," and "unresolved tensions and ambiguities," all of which
suggests very clearly that rational resolution of these tragic choices is not possible in
their judgment. Id. at 18-19.
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to save ultimate values from necessary desolation."48  Does this
mean they really want all of us to have a clear reflective awareness
of these tragic choices and of the invisible decision mechanisms we
employ to mask these choices? If so, what is the point of invisible
decision mechanisms? From whom are we seeking to hide some
tragic truth? From ourselves? Then why be reflective about the
matter? From someone else? Who might that be? Here we have a
serious moral problem.
The passages just quoted evoke images of a tragic moral hero,
committed to ennobling ideals, but knowing that they are destined
to be defeated. Does this mean Calabresi and Bobbitt want every
post-fifty-five-year old working class Briton in renal failure to
understand and accept the denial of dialysis to himself because the
government chose to limit resources for dialysis?49 This would be
heroic. But, if this heroism were possible, there would be no need
for invisible rationing mechanisms. By way of contrast, British
physicians understand how things are with respect to dialysis.
Nothing is invisible to them. They have an opportunity to be moral
heroes. So, how many fifty-seven year-old British physicians in renal
failure, complicated by diabetes, just accept their tragic fate? The
point is that it is too easy to rationalize the imposition of injustice
on others under the noble guise of necessary tragic choices. Further,
we do them a double injustice when we render this imposition
invisible under the guise of protecting from corrosion the moral
bonds that link us with them in a moral community. At the very
least we are guilty of undermining the possibility of a critical moral
conversation that we (societal powerholders) would find both
embarrassing and pointless since we contend the moral tragedy is
inescapable anyway.
50
A major moral problem, then, with these invisible rationing
mechanisms is that they tend to create an invisible class of "others,"
who may be victims of injustice without knowing that they have
48 Id. at 27.
49 See supra notes 40 & 44.50 Thomas Halper supports this point nicely:
Of course, this political role [of the nephrologist in Great Britain as
allocative agent for the state] is nowhere explicitly acknowledged. This is
not a trivial matter, for it helps to ensure that the vast majority of patients
and their families-and even a few physicians themselves-will be blind to the
true nature of the situation. Thus blind, they will mistake political
judgments for medical ones and be far more likely to acquiesce.
HALPER, supra note 40, at 133; see also id. at 128-40.
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been victimized. If that is what is really meant when we speak of
the need to "preserve the moral foundations of social collabora-
tion,"51 then it is not difficult to imagine why these "others" would
not wish to be part of such a moral community. The virtue of a
democratic consensus approach to health care rationing, even in a
nonideal form, is that it avoids creating these "others" who can be
victimized within a "moral" community. There are no "others"
because all are part of the social conversation that generates the
rationing principles and protocols that will apply to all.
This brings me to my second moral criticism. The language of
"tragic choices" tends to insulate the consciences of societal
decisionmakers from critical moral self-reflection, for the implica-
tion of the phrase is that the injustices are necessary and inescap-
able. I will grant for the sake of argument that some mix of
injustices really is inescapable as far as health care rationing is
concerned, that no matter what we do in articulating some compre-
hensive mix of rationing principles and protocols, some number of
individuals will be denied opportunities for extra life-years or will
have to endure some extra death-risks for which there will be no
uniquely adequate moraljustification. That is, these individuals can
reasonably claim they were treated unjustly. But what follows from
this? Surely we ought to make a distinction between a completely
random, episodic distribution of injustices in a society and a
patterned distribution of injustices that might be a product of
decentralized decisionmaking mechanisms, a pattern that might not
even be visible to the dispersed decisionmakers, but that might
nevertheless reflect certain deep-seated social biases. A random
pattern of necessary instances of injustice would be morally
tolerable in a world where perfect justice was not realizable. But a
patterned distribution of injustices, especially one that reflects other
societal biases, is a rather different matter and should not be
immune from moral criticism. Yet the language of tragic choices
totally obscures this distinction and would prevent societal moral
self-criticism.
In summary, the notion of tragic choices licenses a morally
laissez faire attitude. Such a state of affairs hardly contributes to
preserving "the moral foundations of social collaboration." Honesty
is undermined. Fairness and various individual rights are threat-
ened. And the moral and political autonomy of individuals is
51 CALABRESI & BOBBIT, supra note 26, at 18.
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seriously compromised because others will make decisions that
might profoundly affect their lives without their having the
opportunity to participate in the making of those decisions. Again,
what this analysis suggests is that a democratic consensus approach
to health care rationing is more likely to yield results that are just,
in part, because they are freely self-imposed.
V. JUST HEALTH CARE RATIONING:
THE NEED FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS
If we can create public social processes through which rationing
decisions become something that we collectively impose upon
ourselves, then we will have rationing decisions that will have at
least prima facie moral legitimacy. The model I defend is the
informed democratic consensus model. "Informed" means that the
consensus is a product of rational deliberation, both moral and
scientific. The best available scientific information shapes the
conversation as well as the best methods of critical moral reflection.
Put negatively, the consensus is not a product of random polling of
haphazardly held public opinion and prevailing biases. Next,
"democratic" is intended to convey the idea that this is a public
conversation among free and equal individuals. The basic model I
have in mind here is that described by Bruce Ackerman in Social
Justice in the Liberal State.52 Participants in the conversation are
committed to rationality, liberal neutrality, and undominated
equality.53 Finally, I wish to follow Bruce Jennings in advocating
a "morally thick" conception of consensus, one that is not merely a
contingent historical fact with no rational or justificatory power.
Rather, consensus has moral force when it "emerges out of
deliberations that are honest, factually well-informed, rule-governed,
and fair," and when "there are no widely recognized, independent
grounds for establishing the moral truth," and "there are no single,
authoritative judges or decisionmakers available." 54  This is
essentially the situation that we find ourselves in with respect to the
issue of justice and health care rationing. That is, we have several
5 2 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIALJUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
53 See id. at 3-30. James Fishkin endorses essentially the same three "democratic
conditions" as Ackerman, though he labels them political equality, nontyranny, and
deliberation. SeeJAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS
FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 29-41 (1991).
5 BruceJennings, Possibilities of Consensus: Toward Democratic Moral Discourse, 16
J. MED. & PHIL. 447, 451 (1991).
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broad conceptions of justice in our society, but we have failed to
articulate a coherent conception of "health care justice," which
should be thought of as a fairly distinctive "sphere of justice.
" 55
We need to explain a bit more about the democratic consensus
model and the reasons why it is morally preferable to any alternative
approach to health care rationing. Though this is highly simplified,
the alternative approaches would seem to be: (1) rationing by
markets/ability to pay; (2) rationing at the bedside by individual
physicians; (3) rationing by bureaucrats or legislators or health care
administrators.
The moral virtue of markets is that they are impersonal or
impartial; markets do not make invidious discriminations. They
reflect rather than correct broader societal inequities and discrimi-
nations, however, and in that respect they are not morally neutral
distributional instruments. Moreover, markets fail to distinguish
between health desires (tummy tucks) and health needs (cancer
chemotherapy), which is a moral failing, if we believe that health
needs ought to be met before health desires. Markets are also
supposed to be paradigmatically efficient. Although this is generally
true outside of health care, health care markets and market
55 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 3-30 (1983). There are essentially two reasons why the distribution of
health care should be thought of as a distinct sphere ofjustice. First: from a moral
perspective, health care is usually something individuals need rather than simply
desire, and health care today often makes the difference between life and death, or
at least between a substantially impaired life and a highly functional life. This seems
to make health care a distinct kind of social good. Second, from an economic
perspective, we have made health care a distinct kind of good through the insurance
mechanism. Patients do not purchase health services in the way other consumer
goods are purchased, that is, by reference to relative strength of competing
preferences (for patients typically have health needs, not health preferences), or by
reference to their own individual willingness or ability to pay for specific health
services. Instead, there is a common pool of funds that patients may draw upon to
purchase needed health services, and the rules forjudging what counts as a legitimate
draw on those funds are typically nebulous. Specifically, if a physician says that a
health service is needed, then that will count as a legitimate draw on those funds.
The problem, however, is that physicians usually have an economic interest and a
professional interest in maximal well-being for an individual patient that will result
in a constantly expanding definition of what counts as a health need, such that very
marginal benefits will be sought at very great cost-not directly to that individual, but
to society. This represents a real harm, often an injustice, albeit one that is usually
effectively hidden from social scrutiny, as in the excess cancer death rate noted earlier
among the uninsured poor. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. In brief, the
moral challenge within the sphere of health carejustice is to distinguish unfortunate
health outcomes (to which no moral blame attaches) from unjust outcomes (which are
blameworthy and in need of reform).
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competition contribute to extremely wasteful inefficiencies because
of the insurance mechanism. 56 Thus, markets in health care fail
to control escalating health costs, fail to establish morally defensible
priorities for health spending, and tend to generate wasteful and
inequitable inefficiencies of their own.
Physicians might also serve as front-line rationers. The general
idea is that the likelihood of significant health benefit is a morally
defensible basis for establishing health priorities and making
rationing decisions. Physicians are the only ones in our society who
have the professional expertise and knowledge of individual patient
circumstances to make such judgments well. To assist physicians in
making these judgments knowledgeably we need to invest in a major
effort aimed at technology assessment and the development of
practice guidelines that are based on sound clinical research.
However, there is a twofold difficulty with this approach. First,
whether we are talking about practice guidelines, cost-benefit
analyses, cost-effectiveness analyses, or technology assessment, the
judgment must ultimately be made that some therapeutic or
diagnostic intervention does or does not produce enough benefit
(from some societal point of view) to warrant the cost. That is, at
bottom there is a value judgment that needs to be made, and no
amount of empirical clinical research will yield that value judgment.
From whence comes that value? In a liberal democratic society
patients may legitimately ask why they should accept that value
when it is not their value. If they want that 10% chance of an extra
year or two of life that is represented by that autologous bone
marrow transplant for breast cancer that will cost their insurance
company $150,000, then why should they be denied it because
"society" thinks that is a bad buy? Secondly, why should they be
denied it by their physician, who is supposed to be a loyal and
uncompromised advocate of her patients' best medical interests?
5 7
The third alternative approach to health care rationing (relying
upon bureaucratically or legislatively generated rationing protocols)
is supposed to extricate physicians from the above moral dilemma.
56 One such example is the proliferation of Magnetic Resonance Imaging Centers
all over downtown Chicago, like the proverbial dandelions after a spring rain. See
Michael L. Millenson, A Conflict of Image in Health Care, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 23, 1992, § 7,
at 1. He notes that in Florida excess MRI scans cost the insurance pool $185 million
in 1991 alone.57 SeeNorman G. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1573, 1573
(1984) (arguing that "physicians are required to do everything that they believe may
benefit each patient without regard to costs or other societal considerations").
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The general idea is that these rationing protocols come from some
authoritative "outside" source that imposes these protocols upon the
physician so that the physician has no real choice to make, and
hence, is supposed to be morally blameless. However, how could a
morally conscientious doctor allow herself to be used like that?
Furthermore, rationing protocols that are bureaucratically generated
can never be fine-grained enough to apply without judgment or
adjustment to the very unique clinical circumstances of individual
patients, which is to say that clinicians cannot really escape moral
(or medical) responsibility for interpreting and applying these
rationing protocols to individual patients.58 Someone might argue
that rationing protocols generated in the public sector have some
moral legitimacy because the values they reflect are public values or
public interests. But this would be very naive, politically speaking,
for the reality seems to be that competing interest groups signifi-
cantly shape the outcomes of the legislative process, and hence, the
values of more powerful health interest groups would be reflected
in any rationing protocols. If this is true, then what is the moral
justification for physicians being the agents of these more powerful
interest groups against the interests of their patients?
To return to the real world (of bureaucrats and legislators),
actual examples of rationing protocols are very hard to find, which
is why Oregon has gotten so much media attention. Explicit
rationing protocols are extremely divisive and controversial, which
is why they are politically unattractive. In the real world, bureau-
crats and legislators use budgets as rationing tools. In the Medicare
program, DRGs are (suggested) micro-budgets. What any specific
DRG will mean for any particular Medicare patient in the way of
rationing decisions will be infinitely variegated. It may depend
upon a value judgment that a physician makes about a patient with
this much dementia, or who has often been noncompliant, or who is
obnoxious. Or it may depend upon the relative political power of
this physician at this institution, the general idea being that a
physician who is a major referrer to this hospital may exceed DRG
"limits" with greater impunity than a physician who is an average
referrer. Or it may depend upon the overall patient base and
economic strength of the institution, the general idea being that
institutions with a 60% Medicare/Medicaid population will be
compelled to make more rationing decisions and more stringent
58 See E. HAAVi MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF
MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICs 45-70 (1991).
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rationing decisions than an institution with 20% Medicare patients
and virtually no Medicaid patients. In such a situation there is no
overall consistency (even within an institution); there is enormous
opportunity for arbitrary and discriminatory judgments for which
no one will be held accountable; there is no assured rational
relationship between medical need or likelihood of medical benefit
and the diagnostic or therapeutic care that is actually given; there
is no connection at all between the values that drive these rationing
decisions and the values of the patients whose welfare will be most
affected by these decisions; and finally, there is a tendency for
bureaucratic rationing to perpetuate inefficient processes of cost
shifting rather than effective cost containment. As Eddy has
observed, the ultimate cost shift is to future generations,59 who are
unable to defend their interests through the political process. An
outcome like this has nothing to recommend it, either morally or
politically.
This brings us back to an informed democratic consensus
approach to health care rationing. If we want effective cost
containment/rationing in health care (no cost-shifting), then we
have to find a way to link cost and value through patients since they
have the most to gain or lose, wealthwise (as taxpayers/premium
payers) and healthwise (as patients). And if we want a fair approach
to health care cost containment and rationing, then rationing
protocols will have to be public or explicit, rationally justifiable,
autonomously imposed, and impartially generated and applied.
These are all conditions that can be met by the informed democratic
consensus approach.
Both David Eddy and Norman Daniels have identified the
essential moral insight that makes the informed democratic
consensus approach both fair and feasible. 60 It is that any fair
approach to health care rationing must be a product of patient
choice, freely and rationally self-imposed, not simply at an instant
in time, but over the course of a life, and not simply from the point
of view of my actual self, but from the point of view of an indefi-
nitely large number of possible healthy/unhealthy selves I might
59 See David M. Eddy, The Individual vs. Society: Resolving the Conflict, 265JAMA
2399, 2406 (1991).
61 See David M. Eddy, Rationing by Patient Choice, 265 JAMA 105, 107 (1991);
NoRMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS' KEEPER?: AN ESSAY ON JUSTICE BETWEEN THE
YOUNG AND THE OLD 40-65 (1988) (introducing his prudential lifespan account).
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become which, we shall see, will overlap in complex ways with
numerous other selves that comprise our society.
Eddy argues that patients must ask themselves the following kind
of questions: "Is it worth $900 to perform magnetic resonance
imaging for a patient with a headache if there is a 1% chance of
finding a treatable tumor?... Is $10,000 too much for a treatment
that reduces one-year mortality after a heart attack by 1%? " 61 Of
course, if it is someone else's money that I am spending, and if I am
the patient terrified of dying who has had the heart attack, then no
amount of money is too much for however slight a medical benefit.
If that is the conclusion we reach, then fairness and efficiency have
both been defeated. So Eddy wants us to think about these kinds
of questions from the point of "Patients," * (with a capital "P") that
includes both the well and the ill. This yields a suitably impartial
perspective, though it now seems like a very distant and depersonal-
ized perspective, not something that I would initially recognize as
representing my own autonomous choices. Eddy, however, argues
this is more appearance than reality.
Eddy asks us to consider the case of a fifty-year-old woman with
metastatic breast cancer. Should society offer her an autologous
bone marrow transplant (ABMT) at a cost of $150,000 if at best her
chances of a cure are 5%? That same $150,000 would buy ten years
of mammograms for 150 women between age fifty and sixty, the
result being that seven of these women will be saved from death
from breast cancer. 62 What Eddy concludes is that the conflict
represented by this scenario "is not between individuals, but within
each individual." 63 He goes on to observe that "individual patients
and society are not distinct entities. Rather, they represent the
different positions that each of us will be in at various times in our
lives."64 If we have only $150,000 to spend, and if we spend it all
trying to save this patient after she has gotten this disease (believing
thereby that we are doing everything for her), then "everything will
not have been done for that person if you consider that person's
entire lifetime." 65 For that woman could well be one of those
seven women whose life would have been saved by a screening
mammogram if the $150,000 had been available for that purpose.
61 Eddy, supra note 60, at 107.
62 See David M. Eddy, The Individual vs. Society: Is There a Conflict?, 265 JAMA
1446, 1449-50 (1991).
61 Id. at 1449.
64 Id. at 1450 (emphasis added).
65 Id.
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Note that it could have been the case ten years ago that this
woman was part of a pool of one thousand women in a large
corporation who, in order to control their escalating health
insurance premiums, agreed among themselves that it was a better
buy, all things considered, for each and every member of that group
to cover screening mammograms instead of ABMT. This is Eddy's
Patient. And this is also a small scale version of what the informed
democratic consensus approach to health rationing is all about. She
will understand that by making this choice there is a chance that
even with the screening mammogram her cancer will be missed or
detected too late, though there is a significantly greater chance that
her cancer will be detected and her life will be saved through this
screening program. Still, if it is not detected, then she will be
denied the small chance at life represented by ABMT. The morally
important point is that if this happens, then she will be unfortunate,
but she will not have been treated unjustly. She will not have been
denied ABMT by some stingy and uncaring administrator, but by
herself-a free, informed, rational, impartial self06 choosing in
accord with her own values, which, significantly, include a commit-
ment to justice, both fair procedures and fair rationing protocols
agreed to by all.
Note that over a ten-year period it is likely several women in this
group will have breast cancer and will have died because they will
not have been given access to ABMT, which means this woman will
have economically benefitted from those savings. If she herself now
has end-stage breast cancer, and if she pleads and manipulates and
threatens legal action to secure ABMT for herself, and if that
administrator gives in to her entreaties, then both are guilty of
injustice. Hadorn, among others, has observed that this sort of
66 1 want to make clear that the "impartial self" to which I refer is not a mere
heuristic device (like Rawls's well-known "veil of ignorance," see infra note 96 and
accompanying text). Rather, it must be a real world possibility if we are to see just
policies and practices sustained in our society. I will concede that no one is ever
perfectly informed, perfectly rational or perfectly impartial. That, however, is not the
issue. The issue is whether we can be informed enough, rational enough, and
impartial enough to create and accept specific rationing protocols for our future
selves. This is really asking whether we are capable of having an effective sense of
justice. Though there may be many individuals who are lacking this capacity, our
society as a whole sustains complex social practices, such as our system of criminal
and civil justice, which would not be possible unless there were a widely inculcated
sense ofjustice that was effective enough. Explicit rationing protocols reinforce this
effective sense ofjustice, in part, because the very explicitness of the process allows
apparent injustices to be publicly challenged and justified.
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explicit rationing is very difficult to implement in practice because
society is committed to a "duty to rescue" 67 when there are such
visible identifiable patients who are in imminent peril and for whom
there is something we could do that might save their life. But if the
analysis given here is correct, and if our rationing protocols are
products of an informed democratic consensus, then any such
alleged "duty to rescue" is morally specious at best and morally
pernicious at worst because a just consensus about health care
rationing will be violated. This same analysis applies to any
physician who, out of a misguided sense of loyalty or compassion to
this patient before him, acquiesces to the pleas of this patient, for
in truth he will be disloyal to and lacking in compassion for that
larger Patient with whom this patient is also identified.
There are two further questions we need to answer by way of
outlining this model. First, who are the individuals who would be
seeking to achieve this democratic consensus on health care
rationing, and how would they be organized? Second, what
precisely is it that they would be discussing, and what would be the
value standards they would use to achieve consensus?
I imagine that there would be fifty citizen/patients who would
make up a district health council, one per congressional district. In
some broad sense these individuals would be "representative" of
that district, but they would not represent any very specific interest
in that district, such as the heart disease lobby, or the mentally
retarded, or for-profit imaging centers. 68 They would be volun-
teering to carry out a very serious social responsibility. At the
moment I am inclined to think that all providers of health services
(clinicians, administrators, insurers) would be denied membership
on these councils, though they would have ample opportunity to
offer their expert advice to these councils. Each of these district
councils would elect one of their members to serve in a national
health congress. They would be instructed to elect that person
whom they judged to be most judicious and fair-minded. This
national health congress would establish the issue agenda for all the
district councils. What would emerge from democratic deliberation
at the district level would be a local consensus that would provide
67 David C. Hadorn, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-Effectiveness Meets
the Rule of Rescue, 265 JAMA 2218, 2219 (1991).
68 1 realize, that I am ignoring vast and important debates among political
philosophers and political scientists about what "representation" might mean in these
circumstances, both conceptually and practically. Space does not allow addressing
that issue.
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the partially refined material for a national consensus. The local
consensus would include a detailed statement of the reasoning that
supported that consensus.
The Eddy example we discussed above is a very simple example
of what the informed democratic consensus approach means in
practice. That is, the substance of their discussion would involve
priority setting among health services, articulating very specific
rationing protocols, and articulating considered judgments of health
care justice that captured the values that were governing the priority
setting/rationing process. In the real world it seems these councils
would have to discuss literally thousands of diseases and thousands
more therapeutic options to which would be attached a wide range
of probabilities of success. This sounds like an impossible task. But
I imagine it is more manageable than we might first realize. After
all, there would be a very large core of health services for which we
would have a very high degree of consensus that the value of the
services was worth the costs to Patients. Some of those judgments
would change in the light of future clinical research and advances
in medical technology. But I assume that most of the serious public
debate would be around the fringes of that core where the judg-
ment was that the benefits were marginal to very marginal and the
costs very high. This will not be an easy debate. What should ajust
and caring society decide about the level of medical support for a
600-gram premature infant? And what kind of decisions should a
just and caring society make about whether to fund publicly, as part
of a national health program, various treatments for infertility? And
should a just and caring society pay for a hypertension medication
that costs $120 per month rather than one that costs fifteen dollars
per month but that is associated with impotence?
I now need to make explicit what has been a major assumption
behind this democratic consensus model: all in our society would
be part of a single comprehensive health plan. There can be no
Medicare or Medicaid or private health insurance companies.
Pluralism is thought to be an essential feature of our political
system in all policy areas. But in health care pluralism with respect
to health plans results in enormous inefficiencies and intolerable
inequities.
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Ezekiel Emanuel has recently argued for an opposite point of
view. 69 He would allow for thousands of community health plans
in the United States, each with its distinctive value orientation,
philosophy of health, and philosophy of health care rationing.
70
He would use a voucher mechanism that would allow individuals to
choose among plans. 71 Obviously, however, that voucher could
not have a uniform or average value since tens of millions of
individuals would have pre-existing medical conditions that would
generate medical costs well above the annual value of that voucher,
the result being that such individuals would not be wanted by any
of these health plans. The alternative would be to set the value of
the voucher to the anticipated health status of that individual for
that year, which could be an expensive bureaucratic nightmare. I
have provided a very detailed critique of such pluralistic approaches
to national health insurance elsewhere, so I will not repeat those
arguments here.
7 2
In summary, I will simply point out that Eddy's Patient can be
used most effectively as a tool of moral analysis and democratic
deliberation and consensus-building only if all of us can identify
with that Patient, only if all of us must live and die with the same
rationing protocols. That Patient is what forces us to make trade-
offs between cost and value within ourselves rather than seizing the
marginal benefits for ourselves and imposing the costs on others.
Again, Norman Daniels has pointed out most clearly why physicians
cannot in our current system carry out any rationing protocols in
good conscience. 73 We do not have a closed system. A physician
who denies his Medicare patients extra hospital days does not know
that the money he saved will be used to fund more important health
needs of the elderly. For all he knows, those dollars can be used to
bail out failed savings and loan associations. But in the universal
closed system that we envision with explicit health priorities and
69 See EZEKIEL EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE: MEDIcAL ETHics IN A
LIBERAL PoLrrY (1991).
70 See id. at 178-244.
71 See id. at 185-92.
72 See Leonard M. Fleck, How Just Must We Be?, in BIOMEDICAL ETHics REVIEws
1990, at 131 (James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 1991). The focus of my
criticism in this article is the Enthoven-Kronick pluralistic competitive approach to
national health insurance. See Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice
Health Plan for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote
Quality and Economy, 320 NEW ENG.J. MED. 29-37, 94-101 (1989) (two-part article).
7- See Norman Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the United States Is So Hard,
314 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1380, 1382 (1986).
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rationing protocols democratically endorsed, a physician can in
good conscience implement those rationing protocols because the
savings will be recaptured for higher priority health needs, and
those protocols and priorities will have been endorsed by that
patient before her.
74
At present, Oregon represents the only real full-scale model of
what rationing by democratic consensus might look like. It is very
far from being a perfect embodiment of what I have in mind, but it
is more morally defensible as a model than most of its critics are
willing to admit. Oregon's radical policy initiative is usually
described as a "Medicaid rationing experiment." This is a half-truth
that is terribly misleading. Oregon had essentially two policy
objectives. One was to control escalating health costs to the state
budget; the other was to find a way of providing health insurance
for all in the state so that everyone would have assured access to
needed health care. A package of three bills was designed to
achieve these objectives. One bill raised Medicaid coverage from
fifty-eight percent of the poverty level to 100%.75 Another bill
mandated that all employers provide for all workers at twenty hours
per week or more a health insurance benefit package at least equal
to the Medicaid package or pay eight percent of payroll as a health
tax.76 The third bill would create a state insurance fund that
would provide subsidized insurance for those now denied health
insurance.
77
In order to control costs to the state for Medicaid a priority
setting (rationing) scheme was devised. The original version tried
to prioritize 1600 medical interventions with some very unsettling
results. 7s A more recent version identified 709 condition-treat-
74 Note that the integrity of this democratic consensus-building process needs to
be protected from interest group politics as usual. In myjudgment all such interests
are extraneous to the interests of Eddy's Patient, and represent an incursion of the
politics of power into what is supposed to be the arena of rational political
deliberation. Hence, I imagine that the role of the U.S. Congress would be to set a
national health budget, but Congress itself would have nothing to do with establish-
ing, ratifying, or modifying health priorities or rationing protocols. All of this would
be the sole responsibility of the national health congress. Oregon made a similar
separation of responsibility between its Health Commissioners and the state
legislature. In my judgment this was both prudent and necessary.
7 See S. 27, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 OR. LAWs 836.
76 See S. 935, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 OR. LAWs 381.
77 See S. 534, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 OR. LAWs 838.
78 See e.g., David C. Hadorn, The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise: Quality of Life and
Public Policy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1991, at supp. 11, 11 (noting that the
original version prioritized office visits for minor problems over certain life-saving
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ment pairs that have been ranked in seventeen categories. 79 Those
medical interventions that are most effective, that achieve substan-
tial medical good at reasonable cost, and that save or prolong lives
of reasonable quality rank higher on that priority list. Oregon will
fund as far down that list as the state budget permits. The
expectation at this writing is that funding will cover the first 587
services.
80
Oregon deserves credit because this entire process was carried
out with a clear sensitivity to the relevant moral values. 8' It was
not just an exercise in economics, statistics, and organizational
behavior. There was an explicit commitment to universal basic
health care for all. The state made a commitment to a process of
decisionmaking that was fully public and visible, and rejected the
irrationalities and injustices that are typical of virtually every state
Medicaid program wherein individuals would be thrown off
Medicaid rolls in order to help balance the state budget with no
attention paid at all to their current health status or health needs.
Efficiency considerations could now be harnessed to yield greater
equity-the more wasteful, marginally beneficial medical interven-
tions that could be identified, the more resources that would be
available for relatively more beneficial care for more of the
medically needy.
A serious effort was made to involve as large a segment as
possible of the public in the process so that it could be justifiably
maintained that this rationing approach was self-imposed and
democratically determined. About forty-seven forums were held
and somewhere in excess of 1000 people participated.8 2 But, as
Fox and Leichter note, the vast majority of those in attendance were
health care professionals,8 3 hardly a representative cross-section of
citizens of Oregon. There was also a random telephone survey of
1000 Oregonians. 84 At best, it is fair to say that the Oregon
surgeries).9 See id. at supp. 11-12. For a more detailed description of Oregon's efforts, see
Charles J. Dougherty, Setting Health Care Priorities: Oregon's Next Steps, HAsTINGS
CENTER REP., May-June 1991, at supp. 1, and Hadorn, supra note 67, at 2220-21.
80 See David M. Eddy, Oregon's Plan: Should It Be Approved?, 266JAMA 2439, 2439
(1991).
81 See, e.g.,John Kitzhaber, Rationing Health Care: The Oregon Model, THE CENTER
REPORT, Winter/Spring 1990, at 3 (discussing the Oregon plan in some detail).
82 See Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, Rationing Care in Oregon: The New




experience is an example of modest democracy and modest
participation. Still, it is a start. The real question for us is whether
this is a damning indictment of the democratic consensus approach.
In my judgment it is not.
The most serious and oft repeated criticism of this process was
that it represented exploitation of the Medicaid poor.85 The poor
were to be the guinea pigs for a social experiment in health care
rationing while the middle class observed from the safety of their
Blue Cross plans. However, to make these criticisms stick two
things would have to be shown: (1) the poor as a class were less well
off under this experimental program than in the old Medicaid; and
(2) the poor themselves would not autonomously choose to be part
of this program. As I have argued elsewhere, neither of these
claims are true.86  Oregon is putting at least 30 million more
dollars into Medicaid, and forty-two percent more of the poor will
be eligible for Medicaid.8 7 The total package of services for each
poor person will be less robust, but the services they will be denied
will be (for the most part) marginally beneficial, noncostworthy
services. But would a poor person rationally and freely accept these
trade-offs? Yes! There is considerable turnover below the poverty
level-about twenty-five percent per year.88 That is, the very poor
get part-time jobs that make them ineligible for Oregon Medicaid
services, which are provided to only fifty-eight percent of those
below the federal poverty level. Not only do they lose Medicaid, but
they cannot afford private health insurance, which means no
assured access to any health care at all.8 9 Under Medicaid ration-
ing they give up potentially life-saving experimental transplants of
some kinds, for which there is a very low probability that they will
have the relevant need, in exchange for a broad array of health
services which they are most likely to need. This is not a perfectly
just exchange, and it does not emerge from a democratic conversa-
tion characterized by undominated equality. But elsewhere I have
85 See, e.g., Oregon Medicaid Rationing Experiment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 116, 117 (1991) (statement of Robert J. Castagna, Executive Director,
Oregon Catholic Conference; outlining the Oregon Catholic Conference's stance that
Oregon's approach threatens the basic rights of the poor).
86 See Leonard M. Fleck, The Oregon Medicaid Experiment: Is It Just Enough?, 9 Bus.
& PROF. ETHIcSJ. 201, 211-14 (1990).
87 See id. at 212.
88 See id. at 211.
89 See id. at 211-12.
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made a case for saying that it is "just enough" in a nonideal world
in the political circumstances that Oregon itself has no control
over.90 Along these same lines Eddy offers a useful thought
experiment: if the proposed Medicaid rationing program were now
in place in Oregon, and if Oregon appealed to Congress for a
Medicaid waiver to put in place what they currently have (400,000
uninsured; Medicaid for only fifty-eight percent of the poor) would
Congress enthusiastically grant that waiver on the grounds that the
poor would be better off? 91
What would be better, and why would it be better? In Michigan
the Medical Ethics Resource Network of Michigan and the Center
for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences at Michigan State
University have launched a statewide democratic consensus-building
project: "Just Caring: Conflicting Rights, Uncertain Responsibili-
ties." 92 The project will occur at twenty to twenty-five sites, with
fifty project participants at each site-individuals who are in
leadership roles and broadly representative 'f the community at
large. Each site will hold twenty-five to thirty public forums over a
two-year period in which those fifty individuals will participate. The
public is invited to attend those formal conversations. For each
session, a reading packet is provided to project participants so that
we have an informed public conversation. Each session has a very
detailed issue agenda and discussion questions that link the readings
to it. For example, the issue for the evening might be justice and
resource allocation for severely impaired infants. We would have
several very concrete cases, like that of Michael, which would
illustrate the range of decisions that need to be made. The
objective for the session would be to see whether we could come to
a tentative consensus on some considered judgments of health care
justice that will assist us in framing morally justifiable social policy
in this area. University faculty serve as facilitators of this democrat-
ic conversation, but there will be virtually no lecturing in these
public forums. Though participants in the conversation bring their
social roles with them (e.g., physician, corporate vice-president),
they are not there to defend the interests of the group they might
represent, and they are urged to speak to one another as free and
90 See id. at 211-14.
91 See Eddy, supra note 80, at 2445.
92 The interested reader may write to Leonard Fleck for a 15-page project booklet
that describes the "Just Caring" project in detail.
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equal citizens (undominated equality) so that the conversation
advances by force of reason, not political pressure.
The general idea in these conversations is that over a long
enough period of time a large number of these tentative considered
judgments of health care justice would emerge from case scenarios
across the health care spectrum. Thosejudgments would have to be
brought into balance with one another since they are all part of the
sphere of health care justice. The objective would be to achieve a
kind of reflective equilibrium that was "just enough" from the point
of view of Eddy's Patient, that is, just enough to all the possible
future selves that are me and just enough to all those other selves
that comprise my society. Again, the consensus that we seek
regarding health care justice is as much within ourselves as it is
among ourselves.
Bruce Ackerman speaks of "constitutional moments," defining
political moments in the life of a society. 93 That analogy captures
well what the "Just Caring" project is about; for, in important
respects, we are at a defining moment in the arena of health care
politics and policy. We are in need of a "health care constitution,"
which is what we expect to emerge at the end of this two-year
process. 94 More specifically, the goals of the "Just Caring" project
are to: (1) articulate a comprehensive and coherent conception of
health care justice that speaks to our problems of health care justice;
(2) identify what we judge to be the most serious injustices and
inefficiencies in our current health system and health policy; (3)
articulate a set of basic social values and considered judgments of
justice that just and costworthy health policies in our society must
satisfy; (4) articulate a set of principles for priority setting among
93 See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1056 (1984).
94 For Ackerman legislative politics, or politics as usual, would be completely
inadequate during constitutional moments. See id. at 1055-56. The argument of this
essay is that we are at such a moment, at least within the sphere of health care policy.
Citizen/patients must seize the initiative. To leave health care reform to legislators
and administrators is to guarantee that we will have a health care system that is
neither fair nor efficient. Creating a constitution is a supreme political act of
autonomy through which is fashioned solidarity among a people, at least if all have
had an opportunity to participate in that act. A constitution is a comprehensive
document that brings together and balances numerous political values. A constitution
creates the stability needed to sustain an effective sense ofjustice across generations.
Hence, what we need at the basis of health care reform is a constitution that
articulates our collective sense of what ajust and caring society ought to be when it
comes to both providing and limiting access to health care.
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health needs that best capture what a just and caring society
(constrained by resource limits) ought to be; and (5) articulate a
comprehensive set of policy options for financing health care,
expanding access to adequate health care, and containing health
costs that are congruent with the priority setting principles and
basic social values to which we will have committed ourselves.
9 5
What we are engaged in here is not some abstract philosophic
conversation. The conversation moves freely back and forth from
cases like that of Michael or Helga Wanglie to the level of social
policy (what should we do in the way of resource allocation for 6000
infants like Michael or 10,000 patients in a persistent vegetative
state?) to the level of the broader social values we want to affirm.
Moreover, what is affirmed and repeated and emphasized through-
out the conversation is that we are not talking about the fate of
strangers or distant others in our society. Rather, we are talking
about our future possible selves, who might be afflicted with
Alzheimer's, suffer from a form of cancer where a $150,000 bone
marrow transplant is the only hope for survival, have a grandchild
like Michael, get AIDS, or have an unemployed brother without
health insurance, and so on.
The philosopher John Rawls is well known for his "veil of
ignorance" thought experiment wherein all members of our society
have to talk to one another about what basic principles ofjustice we
want operative in our society.9 6 This conversation occurs behind
a veil of ignorance where all of us are like disembodied spirits who
know nothing at all about ourselves as individuals. The general idea
is that this facilitates choosing principles from an impartial point of
view. This looks like something philosophically interesting, but
having no possibility of real world exemplification. In the matter of
health care, however, the vast majority of us are like Rawls's
disembodied spirits behind that veil of ignorance. We are capable
95 Elsewhere in this Issue Professor Leslie Francis speaks to the problem of vague
consumer expectations about access to health care, the kind of now very costly
expectations that many retirees have with regard to health benefits they have been
"promised." See Leslie Pickering Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health
Care, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1881 (1992). The virtue of the "Just Caring" project in
particular, and the democratic consensus approach it exemplifies, is that it provides
a public mechanism through which we can explicitly and mutually affirm what should
count as just and reasonable health care expectations regarding societally provided
health care. Moreover, this can be (and must be) a moving reflective equilibrium that
is constantly responsive to changes required by emerging medical technologies.
96 See Rawls, Kantian Constructivism, supra note 3, at 522-23.
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of a rare degree of impartiality because we really do not know
enough about our future health needs.
The post-World War II "baby boom" generation is in middle age
now. And, as mentioned earlier, the elderly are the largest
disproportionate users of health services in our society. There are
approximately thirty-one million elderly now, but by the year 2030
there will be sixty-two million, representing a very large percentage
of the population. 97 The thought of age-rationing is seen by many
as a morally vile option-and it is, if what we imagine is the healthy
young denying the infirm elderly life-sustaining care.- The alterna-
tive is that we who are now in middle age make rationing decisions
about our future elderly selves. There does not appear to be
anything intrinsically abhorrent morally about that alternative, and
those are precisely the kinds of choices that can be appropriately
made through the informed democratic consensus approach
embodied in the "Just Caring" project.
In summary, what are the moral and political virtues of the
informed democratic consensus model for health care rationing as
embodied in "Just Caring"? First, rationing decisions are visible,
explicit, and open to critical assessment. Second, rationing
decisions are freely self-imposed. No one is coercively imposing
these decisions on weak or vulnerable others. What we need to
make are hard choices for ourselves and those we care about.
Third, what occurs here is a comprehensive and coherent approach
to health care rationing. We have no moral footing at all when we
are expected to make rationing decisions about Michael or Helga
Wanglie as isolated cases. There is ample opportunity in such
situations for completely arbitrary decisions. But the point of
having a two-year conversation is that we then have a comprehensive
moral framework that allows us to make reflective balancing and
trade-off decisions. In fact, a fuller description of this model would
describe it as "constrained" democratic consensus; for, as the
conversation evolves and we deal with a broader range of specific
problems of health care rationing, we will find ourselves rationally
and morally constrained by the value commitments and considered
97 See Edward L. Schneider &Jack M. Guralnik, The Aging of America: Impact on
Health Care Costs, 263JAMA 2335,2337 (1990). As these authors point out, not all the
elderly are equally costly. Older age cohorts among the elderly are generally more
costly than younger cohorts. See id. What they find most troubling is that the "oldest
old," those over age 85, will grow substantially over the next several decades, see id.
at 2335-36, the result being a sixfold increase by the year 2040 in Medicare costs for
this group in constant 1987 dollars, see id. at 2335.
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judgments of health care justice made earlier, in much the same way
that legal precedent works. This is how we can achieve democrati-
cally and liberally a reflective equilibrium regarding health care
justice that has rational moral substance (as opposed to being an
arbitrary product of public opinion).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I have argued that the problem of health care
rationing is fundamentally a moral problem, and that the only way
in which decisions can be made fairly is through processes that are
visible and public and yield rationing principles and protocols that
are self-imposed. The informed democratic consensus model I have
sketched is the only approach to health care rationing with which I
am familiar that meets all those conditions. That does not mean
there is no appropriate role for markets or bureaucratic approaches
to health care rationing. It only means that the legitimate use of
these other approaches will be morally constrained by what emerges
from that informed democratic consensus. For example, the
working assumption of this essay has been that non-costworthy
health care is beyond justice. That is, a society that chooses to
exclude such health services from the package of services guaran-
teed to all has treated no one unjustly. I realize, of course, that in
practice what counts as costworthy health care will be a product of
moral, political, economic, and medical judgment. My point is that
in the arena of health services beyond justice, which will have been
delineated through democratic consensus, market mechanisms may
operate freely.
There are individuals who are extremely risk-averse, who may
want (and be able to afford) non-costworthy health services that
could conceivably be covered by an insurance product of some sort.
So long as there is no public subsidy for these insurance products,
as there is now through the tax code, and so long as no one else is
disadvantaged in terms of access to needed health care by such
insurance products, markets for such products will not generate any
injustices. Similarly, in the domain of truly experimental medicine
considerations of justice articulated through democratic consensus
will greatly underdetermine who ought to have access to those
experimental therapies. Instead, canons of good clinical research
may justifiably exclude individuals who could conceivably benefit
from those therapies but whose comorbid conditions will likely
confound the scientific reliability of the data. Such individuals will
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not have been treated unjustly because here too we will largely be
in a domain beyond justice.
Finally, a theme throughout the essays in this volume is
accountability. No other approach to health care rationing fosters
accountability as well as does the informed democratic consensus
approach. If through broad mechanisms of public deliberation we
generate and approve a complex system of rationing protocols
aimed at distributing limited health resources as fairly and cost-
effectively as possible for our future selves, then what we are also
saying is that we are responsible for those protocols and their
consequences. As things are now, no one is responsible for meeting
the health needs of the uninsured and underinsured; no one is
responsible for making sure that costworthy, and only costworthy,
health care is purchased; no one is responsible for assuring the
fairness of various rationing mechanisms. This allows us the
psychologically comforting illusion that the excess cancer death rate
among the uninsured poor is merely unfortunate rather than clearly
unjust. This illusion is sustainable because responsibility for this
outcome is so thoroughly diffused among millions of taxpayers (who
refuse to pay higher taxes), thousands of physicians (who fail to
provide enough charity care), thousands of stingy insurance
managers (who are more aggressively resisting cost-shifting efforts
for charity care), thousands of state legislators and bureaucrats (who
trim Medicaid rolls and benefits and payment levels to balance state
budgets), and the uninsured poor themselves (who should have
worked harder, saved money for health insurance, and been more
attentive to their health in the first place).
There are alternative approaches to assuring accountability for
health care rationing: physicians at the bedside can take that
responsibility, or else government bureaucrats can fashion very
detailed rationing protocols. If physicians at the bedside are given
that responsibility, then we would almost certainly compromise trust
and integrity in the doctor-patient relationship. On the other hand,
if government bureaucrats take on that responsibility, then the
perception of citizen-patients denied wanted but non-costworthy
health care will be that uncaring, indifferent, ignorant outside
parties are unjustly depriving them of life and liberty. That is, these
citizen-patients can effectively deny that they themselves have any
responsibility for making these rationing decisions.
In the final analysis both bedside physicians and some sort of
governmentally legitimated entity (the health congress) will have
responsibility for precisely articulating and implementing a set of
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explicit rationing protocols. But the moral and political legitimacy
of those protocols will ultimately have to be derived from the
informed democratic consensus we described above, which correctly
locates responsibility for these decisions in each of us and all of us.
If we (democratic citizens) do not want rationing protocols
coercively imposed upon us, then we need to make these choices for
ourselves. If we want a health care system that is just and caring
and costworthy, and that reflects our conception of these basic
values, then we (as future patients but present premium payers/
taxpayers) will have to take responsibility for making these choices
and trade-offs for ourselves. Contrary to Calabresi and Bobbitt,
these are not tragic choices with which we are faced. Rather, the
real tragedy would be failing to take this responsibility. The real
tragedy would be continued moral indifference to the implicit (and
irresponsible) rationing mechanisms (markets, Medicare DRGs) that
currently constrain our health costs at the expense ofjustly needed
health care by others.
